We consider bargaining problems that involve two participants, with a nonempty closed, bounded convex bargaining set of points in the real plane representing all realizable bargains. We also assume that there is no definite threat or disagreement point that will provide the default bargain if the players cannot agree on some point in the bargaining set. However, there is a nondeterministic threat: if the players fail to agree on a bargain, one of them will be chosen at random with equal probability, and that chosen player will select any realizable bargain as the solution, subject to a reasonable restriction.
INTRODUCTION
We consider bargaining problems that involve two participants, with a nonempty closed, bounded convex bargaining set of points representing all realizable bargains.
That is, to each point corresponds at least one agreement, or bargain, and to each realizable bargain there corresponds a unique point in . The coordinates of each point represent the utility of that bargain to each of the players. We consider the bargaining problem to be equivalent to the selection of some point in to which both players agree.
A solution to the bargaining problem is then regarded as any one of the bargains corresponding to the selected point. We also assume that there is no definite threat or disagreement point d that will provide the default bargain if the players cannot agree on some point in the bargaining set. However, there is a nondeterministic threat: if the players fail to agree on a bargain, one of them will be chosen at random with equal probability, and that chosen player will select any realizable bargain as the solution, with one restriction: there must be no bargain with the same utility to the chosen player, with 
, where ( ) ( ) Proof: First note that because of A1, the first player will never rationally accept any point ( ) , x y T ∈ with abscissa less than that of ( ) t T , because in that case the threat scenario has a higher expected payoff to the first player than ( ) , x y and can be obtained unilaterally by the first player's refusing to bargain. Similarly, because of A1, the second player will never rationally accept any point ( ) , x y T ∈ with ordinate less than that of , because in that case the threat scenario has a higher expected payoff to the second player than (
) , x y and can be obtained unilaterally by the second player's refusing to bargain. Therefore, the rationality of the players implies ( ) ( ) 
